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Salt Lake City, UT 84151-0210 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
BRADLEY L. TILT 
Attorney at Law 
Direct Dial: (801) 323-2234 
Facsimile: (801) 596-2814 
btilt@fabianlaw.com 
SEP 2 2 2005 
September 22, 2005 
Utah Court of Appeals 
450 South State Street 
P.O. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0230 
Re: Joel Sill v. Bill Hart, d/b/a Hart Construction 
Appellate Case No. 20050245-CA 
Court: 
Under cover of this letter, Appellee Bill Hart, d/b/a Hart Construction, provides to the 
Court a copy of the following case authority that is supplemental to those authorities cited in the 
Brief of Appellee that is on file herein: Robert Pearson, d/b/a Robert Pearson Construction v. 
Suzanne J. Lamb, 2005 UT App 383. This supplemental citation is provided now because it is a 
ruling of this Court made after briefing in this case was completed. 
The Pearson case pertains to two of the issues raised in the parties' briefs in this above-
referenced pending appeal. First, the argument of Appellant {e.g., Brief of Appellant, pp. 6-21) 
that Utah Code § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001), the statute at issue both in this case and in the Pearson case, 
is "mandatory" and therefore a "jurisdictional" bar to certain mechanics' lien claims. Pearson, 
2005 UT App. 383 f 17-12 (holding it is not "mandatory" or "jurisdictional"). Second, the 
argument of Appellee (Brief of Appellee, pp. 30-32) that the district court's ruling that the statute 
does not apply to this case in any event should be upheld as being in accord with the underlying 
purpose of the mechanics' lien statutes to protect those who provide labor and materials that add 
value to the property of another. Pearson, 2005 UT App. 383 fflJ8 & 11 (noting and upholding that 
policy). 
Sincerely, 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
- / • * & 
Bradley >T Tilt 
BLT/jd 
Enclosure 
cc: David B. Thompson, Attorney for Appellant, w/encl. 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Robert Pearson dba Robert 
Pearson Construction, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Suzanne J. Lamb, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20040613-CA 
F I L E D 
(September 9, 2005) 
2005 UT App 383 
Third District, Silver Summit Department, 020500636 
The Honorable Bruce Lubeck 
Attorneys: David B. Thompson, Park City, for Appellant 
David M. Bennion and Michael P. Petrogeorge, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Davis, Orme, and Thorne. 
DAVIS, Judge: 
|^l Suzanne J. Lamb (Defendant) appeals the trial court's denial 
of her motion for a new trial, in which she argued that the 
failure of Robert Pearson (Plaintiff) to comply with Utah Code 
section 38-1-11(4)(a) divested the trial court of jurisdiction. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(4) (a) (2001) . We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
%2 In October 2002, Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking 
foreclosure of a mechanics' lien. Defendant filed her answer in 
December 2002 and an amended answer and counterclaim in February 
2003/ neither pleading contained allegations that Plaintiff 
failed to comply with the requirements of the Mechanics' Liens 
Act. On April 12, 2004, the parties filed stipulations of fact 
with the district court, stipulating that 
Mr. Pearson has complied with all the 
statutory procedural requirements for 
perfecting and foreclosing on a mechanics' 
lien . . . ; Mrs. Lamb does not defend 
against Mr. Pearson's mechanics' lien claim 
on these statutory procedural grounds, but 
simply challenges his right to receive 
payment of the amounts claimed in the lien. 
A bench trial was held thereafter, and the district court entered 
a memorandum decision in favor of Plaintiff on April 20, 2004. 
1)3 On May 26, 2004, Defendant filed a motion for 
reconsideration (which she now dubs a motion for a new trial), in 
which she argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear 
the foreclosure action because Plaintiff failed to comply with 
the requirements of section 38-1-11 (4) (a) of the Mechanics' Liens 
Act. The trial court, on June 16, 2004, issued a ruling and 
order denying Defendant's motion for a new trial, and on July 28, 
2004, entered a Final Order and Judgment in favor of Plaintiff. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
f4 The only issue before this court is whether Plaintiff's 
failure to comply with section 38-1-11(4)(a) of the Mechanics' 
Liens Act divested the trial court of jurisdiction to hear 
Plaintiff's mechanics' lien foreclosure action. If Plaintiff's 
failure to comply with section 38-1-11(4)(a) did not divest the 
trial court of jurisdiction, it is undisputed that Defendant 
waived that issue, not only by failing to assert it prior to 
trial but also by stipulation. 
H5 The determination of whether a court has subject matter 
jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review for 
correctness, according no deference to the trial court's 
determination. See Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81,1)8, 
31 P. 3d 1147. Questions of statutory interpretation are 
similarly questions of law that are reviewed "for correctness, 
giving no deference to the district court's interpretation." 
Board of Educ. v. Sandy City Corp., 2004 UT 37,1)8, 94 P.3d 234. 
ANALYSIS 
1)6 Under section 38-1-11 (4) (a) of the Mechanics' Liens Act, 
lien claimants filing an action to enforce a lien must serve on 
the defendant-owner of a residence instructions relating to the 
owner's rights and a form affidavit along with the complaint. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(4)(a) (2001). Pursuant to section 
38-1-11 (4) (e), "[i]f a lien claimant fails to provide to the 
owner of the residence the instructions and form affidavit 
required by [sjubsection 4(a), the lien claimant shall be barred 
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from maintaining or enforcing the lien upon the residence." Id. 
§ 38-1-11(4) (e) . On appeal, Defendant argues that the language 
of section 38-1-11(4)(e) makes subsection 4(a) "mandatory," 
thereby making it a jurisdictional provision that cannot be 
waived and can be raised at any time. Defendant thus contends 
that Plaintiff's failure to comply with requirements of section 
38-1-11(4) (a) deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to hear 
Plaintiff's lien foreclosure action. 
%1 Whether a procedure prescribed by statute is jurisdictional 
depends on whether the procedure is "mandatory" or "directory." 
Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 919 P.2d 547, 552 (Utah 
1996). And while a procedure is generally considered "mandatory" 
when "consequences are attached to the failure to act," Stahl v. 
Utah Transit Auth., 618 P.2d 480, 481 (Utah 1980), the purpose of 
the statute and the legislature's intent are of the utmost 
importance: 
There is no universal rule by which directory 
provisions may, under all circumstances, be 
distinguished from those which are mandatory. 
The intention of the legislature, however, 
should be controlling and no formalistic rule 
of grammar or word form should stand in the 
way of carrying out the legislative intent . 
. . . The statute should be construed 
according to its subject matter and the 
purpose for which it was enacted. 
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 575 P.2d 705, 706 
(Utah 1978) (alterations in original) (quotations and citation 
omitted); see also Stahl, 618 P.2d at 482 ("A statute is, of 
course, to be construed in light of its intended purposes."). 
Therefore, "[a] designation is mandatory, and therefore 
jurisdictional, if it is 'of the essence of the thing to be 
done.'" Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 919 P.2d at 552 
(quoting Kennecott Copper Corp., 575 P.2d at 706) (other 
quotations and citations omitted); see also Projects Unlimited, 
Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co., 798 P.2d 738, 744 (Utah 
1990) ("We must determine whether the rigorous interpretations 
urged by [defendants] are necessary to protect the interests of 
the parties in the instant situation. Unless we find that 
[Plaintiff's] alleged failures have compromised a purpose of the 
mechanic[s'] lien statute, those failures will be viewed as 
technical . . . .") . 
if8 The Mechanics' Liens Act was passed primarily to protect 
laborers who have added value to the property of another, but 
also to protect the property owner's right to convey clear title: 
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[T] he purpose of the mechanic [s'] lien act is 
remedial in nature and seeks to provide 
protection to laborers and materialmen who 
have added directly to the value of the 
property of another by their materials or 
labor. On the other hand, we recognize that 
liens create an encumbrance on property that 
deprives the owner of his ability to convey 
clear title and impairs his credit . . . . 
State legislatures and courts attempt to 
balance these competing interests through 
their mechanic[s'] lien statutes and judicial 
interpretations thereof. 
Projects Unlimited. 798 P.2d at 743 (quotations and citations 
omitted); see also Mickelsen v. Craigco, Inc., 767 P.2d 561, 563 
(Utah 1989) ("[T] he mechanic[s'] lien law was enacted for the 
benefit of those who perform the labor and supply the materials . 
. . . " ) . We must therefore balance a laborer's right to be paid 
for his labor and materials with the negative impact that liens 
have on an owner's credit and her ability to convey clear title. 
Plaintiff's failure to serve Defendant with instructions and a 
form affidavit is irrelevant to the lien's negative impact, 
whereas invalidating Plaintiff's right to be paid for his labor 
simply because he made a procedural error clearly contravenes the 
intended purpose of the Mechanics' Liens Act. Quite simply, the 
requirements of section 38-1-11(4) (a) have nothing to do with 
"the essence of the thing to be done," Beaver County v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 919 P.2d at 552 (quotations and citations 
omitted), and Plaintiff's failure to comply therewith did not 
compromise a purpose of the Act. 
f9 Furthermore, the procedures set forth in section 38-1-
11(4)(a) are not "mandatory" because no consequences attach to 
the failure to act. See Stahl, 618 P.2d at 481. The omission 
could have been remedied at any time during the course of the 
proceedings, or, had the trial court dismissed Plaintiff's 
mechanics' lien foreclosure action for failure to adhere to 
section 38-1-11(4) (a), the dismissal could have been easily 
addressed by either refiling or, depending on the timing, through 
Utah's savings statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (2002). 
Under Utah's savings statute, 
[i]f any action is commenced within due time 
and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff is 
reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such 
action or upon a cause of action otherwise 
than upon the merits, . . . [the plaintiff] 
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may commence a new action within one year 
after the reversal or failure. 
Id. 
HlO Although Plaintiff may have failed to serve Defendant with 
the instructions and form affidavit required by section 38-1-
11(4)(a), there is no question that he commenced his action 
within due time. "A civil action is commenced (1) by filing a 
complaint with the court, or (2) by service of a summons together 
with a copy of the complaint." Utah R. Civ. P. 3(a). And 
section 38-1-11(1) gives lien claimants twelve months after 
completion of the contract, or 180 days after the lien claimant 
last performed labor, to file suit. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-
11(1). Here, Plaintiff performed labor at the residence 
throughout the spring of 2002 and filed his complaint seeking 
foreclosure in October 2002. Because Plaintiff's action was 
timely commenced and a dismissal for failure to adhere to section 
38-1-11(4)(a) would have been a dismissal "otherwise than upon 
the merits," id. § 78-12-40, Plaintiff could have remedied his 
failure simply by commencing a new action within one year after 
the dismissal. 
fll Unlike "mandatory" designations, "a designation is merely 
directory, and therefore not jurisdictional, if it is 'given with 
a view merely to the proper, orderly and prompt conduct of the 
business, and by the failure to obey no prejudice will occur to 
those whose rights are protected by the statute.'" Beaver County 
v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 919 P.2d at 552 (quoting Kennecott 
Copper Corp., 575 P.2d at 706) (other quotations and citations 
omitted); see also Projects Unlimited, 798 P.2d at 744-50 
(upholding a lien despite its errors because such errors were 
technical and the defendant suffered no prejudice). Therefore, 
Utah courts have held that certain procedures required by statute 
are inconsequential to a court's jurisdiction. For example, in 
Labelle v. McKay Dee Hospital Center, 2004 UT 15, 89 P.3d 113, 
the court determined that a mailing requirement of the Medical 
Malpractice Act was not jurisdictional, stating that construing 
the statute "in a manner to impose jurisdictional consequences on 
a claimant's every procedural stumble is to misapprehend the 
Medical Malpractice Act[]." I^ L. at Hl4. While the court "[did] 
not ignore the fact that the requirement . . . [was] mandatory," 
it stated that the mailing requirement was "a minor component of 
the Malpractice Act's prelitigation scheme. It serve [d] a wholly 
informational role, and it is difficult to envision how 
[defendants] could be prejudiced by being deprived of [the 
mailing] ." Id. at i[l7. And in Kiesel v. District Court, 96 Utah 
156, 84 P.2d 782 (1938), the court interpreted a statute 
requiring a plaintiff to file an undertaking, or bond, securing 
costs contemporaneously with the complaint. The court held that 
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the statute, while affording no discretion to the court, still 
did not create a jurisdictional prerequisite: 
The language of [the statute], while positive 
and mandatory, when considered altogether 
makes the requirement only that the 
undertaking be filed contemporaneously with 
the complaint. This certainly is no stronger 
than the language of [other] statutes which 
require the bond to be filed before 
commencing action. But we think the 
legislature intended to make the requirement 
so positive and unequivocal as to require the 
court to dismiss the suit if the bond was not 
filed at least contemporaneously with the 
complaint if fal motion to dismiss was timely 
made. Otherwise, the court could continue to 
take jurisdiction. 
Id. at 784.' 
i|l2 Like the statute construed in Kiesel, the requirements of 
section 38-1-11(4) (a) are not conditions precedent to filing 
suit; they simply require action contemporaneous with the filing 
of the complaint. Furthermore, like the Medical Malpractice Act 
construed in Labelle. the Mechanics' Liens Act creates numerous 
procedural hurdles to enforcing a lien. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-
1-7 (2001) (delineating the contents of a notice of lien, and the 
time frame in which it must be filed); id. § 38-1-11(1), (2) 
(delineating the time frame in which suit and a lis pendens must 
be filed). Section 38-1-11 (4) (a) of the Mechanics' Liens Act 
simply requires that certain instructions and a form affidavit be 
served on the defendant; these requirements are "wholly 
informational" and but "a minor component" of the Mechanics' 
Liens Act. Labelle, 2004 UT 15 at Hl7. Finally, like the 
1Other jurisdictions have held that certain "mandatory" 
procedures are inconsequential to a court's jurisdiction. See 
Hodusa Corp. v. Abray Constr. Co., 546 So. 2d 1099, 1101 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (interpreting a statute that required a 
contractor to provide a residence owner an affidavit prior to 
bringing suit, the court stated that "[a]1though the furnishing 
of the affidavit is a condition precedent to bringing an action 
to foreclose a mechanic[s'] lien, failure to do so does not 
create a jurisdictional defect"); Campbell v. Graham, 357 P.2d 
366, 368 (Colo. 1960) (interpreting a statute that barred 
businesses that had not filed trade name affidavits from 
prosecuting suits, the court rejected the proposition that trade 
name filing is a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a suit). 
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defendants in Labelle, it is difficult to envision how Defendant 
here was prejudiced by being deprived of the instructions and 
form affidavit required by section 38-1-11(4) (a). Defendant has 
not alleged that she was prejudiced. In fact, she even 
stipulated that she was not defending against the lien 
foreclosure on statutory procedural grounds, but simply 
"challenge[d] his right to receive payment of the amounts claimed 
in the lien." Quite simply, the requirements of section 38-1-
11(4)(a) are "directory, and therefore not jurisdictional," as 
they merely concern "the proper, orderly and prompt conduct of 
the business" and Defendant has suffered no prejudice. Beaver 
County v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 919 P.2d 547, 552 (Utah 1996) 
(quotations and citation omitted). 
i[l3 Defendant cites numerous cases involving the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act [UGIA], stating that the UGIA's notice 
requirement is comparable to the requirements of section 38-1-
11(4)(a). Such an analogy is erroneous, as the UGIA's notice 
requirement has nothing whatsoever to do with service and mailing 
but instead provides that a claim against the state is barred 
unless notice thereof is filed with the state within one year 
after the cause of action arises. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-
402 (2004); Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth., 618 P.2d 480, 481 (Utah 
1980). In this way, the UGIA's notice requirement is far more 
analogous to Utah Code section 38-1-11(1) and (2), which mandates 
that a mechanics' lien foreclosure action and a lis pendens must 
be filed within twelve months after completion of the contract or 
180 days after the lien claimant last performed labor. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-1-11(1), (2). And like a party's failure to 
adhere to the UGIA's notice requirements, a party's failure to 
timely file a mechanics' lien foreclosure action and lis pendens 
is fatal and cannot be remedied: 
The penalty for not commencing an action to 
enforce a mechanic[s'] lien within the 
twelve-month period provided in section 38-1-
11 is invalidation of the lien . . . . When 
a claimant fails to file the lis pendens 
within the twelve-month period, the lien 
itself is not invalidated, but rather it is 
rendered void as to everyone except those 
named in the action and those with actual 
knowledge of the action. 
Projects Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co., 798 
P.2d 738, 751 n.13, 752 (Utah 1990). Utah courts have thus ruled 
that failure to timely commence a mechanics' lien foreclosure 
action and file a lis pendens, like failure to timely notify the 
state of a claim against it, divests the court of jurisdiction. 
See, e.g., Interlake Distribs., Inc. v. Old Mill Towne, 954 P.2d 
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1295, 1297-99 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (holding that liens were void 
because plaintiffs failed to file a lis pendens)/ Diehl Lumber 
Transp. Inc. v. Mickelson, 802 P.2d 739, 742 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
("Failure to commence a timely mechanic[s1] lien foreclosure 
action divests the court of jurisdiction."); AAA Fencing Co. v. 
Raintree Devel. & Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289, 290-91 (Utah 1986) 
(holding that an untimely mechanics' lien action is a 
jurisdictional issue and "forecloses [the parties'] rights"). 
fl4 Comparison between the requirements of section 38-1-11(4)(a) 
and the UGIA is misplaced also because Utah courts have 
specifically held that the UGIA is to be "strictly construed," 
Great W. Cas. Co. v. Utah Pep't of Transp., 2001 UT App 54,1)9, 21 
P.3d 240, whereas "substantial compliance with the [Mechanics' 
Liens Act] is all that is required," Chase v. Dawson, 117 Utah 
295, 215 P.2d 390, 390 (1950) (relating to the legal sufficiency 
of the notice of lien); see also Projects Unlimited, 798 P.2d at 
743 ("Utah courts have recognized that substantial compliance 
with [the Mechanics' Liens Act's] provisions is all that is 
required."). "Although courts have differing opinions about how 
liberally to construe provisions within their mechanic [s1] lien 
statutes, the modern trend is to dispense with arbitrary rules 
which have no demonstrable value in a particular fact pattern." 
Projects Unlimited, 798 P.2d at 744 (quotations and citation 
omitted). Here, Plaintiff substantially complied with the Act, 
to such an extent that Defendant did not even notice Plaintiff's 
oversight until May 2004, more than eighteen months after the 
complaint was filed and more than one month after Defendant 
stipulated that Plaintiff had "complied with all the statutory 
procedural requirements for perfecting and foreclosing on a 
mechanics' lien." Furthermore, Defendant did not allege how the 
instructions and form affidavit required by section 38-1-11 (a) 
would have conferred any demonstrable value here, but instead 
argued that such value (or lack thereof) was "irrelevant" and "of 
no import." Therefore, Plaintiff's failure to adhere to section 
38-1-11(4)(a) did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
1(15 Since Plaintiff's failure to adhere to section 38-1-11 (4) (a) 
did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction, we affirm the 
trial court's Final Order and Judgment in favor of, and its award 
of reasonable attorney fees and costs below to, Plaintiff. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1) (2001) (awarding reasonable attorney 
fees to the "successful party" in a mechanics' lien foreclosure 
action). Because "[t]he general rule is that when a party who 
received attorney fees below prevails on appeal, the party is 
also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal," Utah Dep't 
of Soc. Servs. v. Adams. 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah Ct. App. 
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1991), we remand the matter to the district court for calculation 
of attorney fees reasonably incurred on appeal. 
1|l6 Affirmed and remanded. 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
K17 I CONCUR: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
ill8 I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
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